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I don’t agree with those whose reaction [to a strong response to climate change] is to warn against 
restricting civil freedoms. Were the forecasts of certain climatologists to come true, our freedoms 
would be tantamount to those of someone hanging from a 20th-storey parapet.1 
 
In Australia, the extensive policy and legal implications of anthropogenic global warming began 
to be understood only in 2006, after the release of the Stern report2 and Al Gore’s documentary 
An Inconvenient Truth. Until then, the Howard government in collaboration with the fossil fuel 
industries had downplayed the extent of anthropogenic warming and its likely impacts.3 The 
delay in Australia’s response has meant that there is still very little Australian legislation which 
addresses climate change4 and no legislation which contains effective mitigation measures. Nor 
has there been a concerted legislative response to the likely impacts of climate change through 
the imposition of effective and proactive adaptation measures. Other Western nations, with the 
exception of the United States, have been somewhat quicker than Australia to respond to a global 
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problem which has been documented since 1990 by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change.5 Thus far, however, there have been no radical cuts in greenhouse gas emissions, even 
though most scientists consider such cuts absolutely necessary to stave off the more catastrophic 
consequences of climate change. 
 
My intention here is to adopt a human rights approach to climate change, and consider the 
implications for human rights and the rule of law in two alternative future scenarios. In the first, 
Western nations decide to take a proactive, strong and even punitive regulatory stance in a 
concerted attempt to curtail global greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate the impacts of climate 
change. I have called such a strategy a ‘war’ on climate change for reasons which I discuss 
below. In the second of these possible scenarios, the ‘war’ on climate change remains unwaged 
and there is no real attempt to mitigate the impacts of runaway climate change.  
 
It is arguable that these are not the only two possible scenarios and that, in fact, Western 
governments will find effective solutions to climate change which jeopardise neither economic 
growth nor the liberal democratic tradition. The Rudd government would have us believe that 
voluntary household measures coupled with mandatory small-scale industrial emission cuts will 
suffice; that we can somehow avoid the worst effects of climate change without resorting to 
draconian legislative measures. Generally, no Western government is prepared to abandon a 
‘business as usual’ approach. However, I have adopted the view, shared by a large number of 
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scientists, that the failure to adopt radical proactive measures will lead inevitably to runaway 
climate change and thus to the second scenario.6 
 
In exploring the consequences for law and liberty in both scenarios, I am responding to the 
concerns expressed by climate change sceptics in the political, business and broader 
communities that strong regulatory action to curb greenhouse gas emissions constitutes a 
needless assault on human rights and the economy. A strong response to climate change will, 
indeed, impinge on certain rights. I have adopted the paradigm of war in relation to such strong 
regulatory action for several reasons: partly because some sacrifice of certain rights is generally 
accepted during a ‘war’, partly because those who advocate strong action on climate change 
commonly employ militaristic terminology and reasoning, and partly because, as we have found 
in the ‘war on terror’, a declaration of war on an abstract noun7 is a common neo-conservative 
response to fear-inducing phenomena.  
 
The language of war and exceptionalism, if adopted in the context of climate change, can have 
profound implications for both human rights and the rule of law, as we have found most recently 
in the war on terror. Of course, the proposed sacrifice of certain human rights in order to 
safeguard other rights is a suggestion which might well be resisted by human rights advocates 
and other liberal thinkers, as well as by climate change sceptics. Liberal-minded and well-
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meaning human rights supporters might baulk at the curtailment of their own rights when the 
rights which will be safeguarded belong, for the most part, to the ‘Other’: to the residents of 
developing nations and to future generations. However, by considering the far more catastrophic 
consequences for human rights in the event that the Western world fails to act, I argue that 
drastic action on climate change is absolutely necessary. If we fail to make certain sacrifices 
now, we jeopardise the fundamental human rights of both future and current generations. Indeed, 
in most depictions of a future world transformed by runaway climate change, law and liberty 
have become redundant concepts. 
 
I - A Matter of Terminology: Waging a ‘War’ on Climate Change 
 
This article is a departure from conventional legal scholarship in its use of a ‘war’ on climate 
change paradigm and its reliance on material from a wide variety of non-legal sources. My use of 
diverse and provocative material and references is deliberate. Caution, precedent and 
conservatism are not, in my view, appropriate tools to tackle climate change. Instead, we need to 
jettison many of our traditional practices and beliefs and respond to climate change in truly 
radical ways. In particular, we will need to make the sorts of sacrifices commonly accepted as 
necessary when we wage war against a common enemy. 
 
As Tom Lynch and Bert Jenkins have pointed out, the customary neo-conservative response to 
environmental challenges and other threats tends to involve conflict and warfare. Therefore, they 
claim, ‘we can expect a “War on Climate Change”, just as we have a “War on Terrorism” and 
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have had a “War on Drugs”’.8 However, thus far references to the need for a war on climate 
change, and militaristic comparisons and metaphors, are found not in the speeches of neo-
conservative politicians nor in the writings of those who endorse neo-conservative views but 
rather in the words and writings of progressive advocates for action against climate change. In 
fact, ironically enough, Australian commentators who have been more than happy to applaud the 
firm measures adopted in the war on terror have dismissed the campaign of climate change 
activists as ill-founded and hysterical, and deplore the suggestion that we should sacrifice 
economic growth for the climate change cause.9 
 
In contrast, one of England’s most celebrated scientists, Stephen Hawking, has stated that ‘we 
should have a war on global warming rather than the war on terror’10 and the equally renowned 
scientist James Lovelock, who developed the Gaia hypothesis (viewing the earth as a single 
organism), is quite prepared to describe oncoming events as a ‘climate war’.11 Lovelock seeks to 
draw salutary lessons from Napoleon’s ill-fated advance upon Moscow in 1872, and from the 
withdrawal of the British army from Dunkirk in 1940,12 and advocates for ‘restrictions, rationing 
and the call to service that were familiar in wartime’.13 The authors of Climate Code Red, David 
Spratt and Philip Sutton, similarly suggest that we need an emergency mobilisation equivalent to 
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that which took place during World War II.14 Furthermore Al Gore, in the well-known 
documentary An Inconvenient Truth, compares our current refusal to take decisive action with 
the inertia which gripped Western Europe in the 1930s, as the German government of Nazi 
fascists seized power, appropriated land and increasingly demonstrated a callous disregard for 
human rights; thus, the ‘horrible unprecedented gathering storm in continental Europe’ in the 
1930s is equivalent to the looming crisis of climate change and must also end with a declaration 
of war.15 
 
Militaristic metaphors abound in the climate change context because war necessitates a strong, 
united response to a significant external threat. At the outset, however, I have to concede that the 
war paradigm is problematic. Firstly, conceptualising a concerted global campaign against 
climate change as a war means that we must identify an enemy, but who or what is the enemy in 
such a war? If the war on terror has shown us nothing else, it has certainly shown us that the 
Western world is quite capable of waging war on an abstract noun.16 Yet in a war on climate 
change, it is unlikely that the enemy will remain disembodied. Antonia Quadara has pointed out 
that terrorism itself may be ‘absolutised, faceless, virtual’ but it is always in need of ‘particular 
bodies to make visible the threat’.17 In the war on terror, the ‘particular bodies’ tend to belong to 
the young Muslim man of Middle-Eastern appearance. Which group will provide us with the 
scapegoats in a war on climate change? 
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Lynch and Jenkins anticipate that in such a war, the ‘vulnerable and (relatively) powerless’ will 
be the victims.18 This would not be the first time that vulnerable individuals have been punished 
for a changing climate; it is probable that certain women were held responsible for the early 
Little Ice Age and burned as witches in sixteenth century Europe.19 Yet it is not the vulnerable 
and powerless who are responsible for climate change, even though they will be the main 
victims. As Robert Aisi, who represents Papua New Guinea in the United Nations, stated to the 
United Nations General Assembly on behalf of the Pacific island countries: ‘We are likely to 
become the victims of a phenomenon to which we have contributed very little and of which we 
can do very little to halt’.20  
 
In fact, to borrow from the title of another article, ‘we have met the enemy and he is us’.21 There 
is no question that the main contributors to global warming are the Western nations and 
Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions per capita are embarrassingly high. Our undeniable 
complicity in the phenomenon of global warming, although we may be complicit ‘without 
passion or intent’,22 is, according to Kochi and Ordan, comparable to the banal acts of evil 
committed by bureaucrats in the Nazi regime.23 Yet it is unlikely that we will wage war on 
ourselves. 
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The other reason why a war on climate change is a problematic concept is that it forms part of 
the language and mindset of conquest which has created the predicament of climate change in 
the first place. Robyn Eckersley has observed that the liberal belief that humankind can use 
instrumental reason and complex technologies to master the natural world and thus expand 
human autonomy ‘has served to imperil rather than expand autonomy for large numbers of 
people and non-human species’.24 Despite the many examples of the failure of reason and 
technology to master nature in a way which benefits humankind as a whole, the prospect of geo-
engineering our way out of the climate change predicament still captivates us in our quest for a 
relatively painless solution to an intractable dilemma. Such solutions include pumping sulphate 
into the atmosphere and capturing and storing carbon. Stephen Hawking’s suggestion that we 
colonise other planets is the most ambitious of such geo-engineering solutions.25 It is also, 
possibly, the most foolhardy, as Jeanette Winterson’s tale in The Stone Gods suggests.26 
Winterson describes a futuristic world in which a group of people and a robot set off on a 
spaceship to colonise a lush new planet – only to discover that their geo-engineered intervention, 
designed to destroy the larger life forms and thereby make the planet more suitable for human 
habitation, triggers a lethal mini Ice Age. As Mike Hulme points out, geo-engineering solutions 
to climate change bear ‘the language of control and mastery over climate’, as indeed do political 
and social engineering solutions27 and indeed, as does the idea of a war on climate change. Yet 
Rachel Carson, a leading ecologist, stated in 1962: ‘We still talk in terms of conquest . . . I think 
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we’re challenged, as mankind has never been challenged before, to prove our maturity and our 
mastery, not of nature but of ourselves’.28  
 
Thus, the use of a militaristic metaphor to inspire Western nations to abandon their apathetic 
‘business as usual’ approach and adopt a more offensive stance on carbon emissions has obvious 
drawbacks. However, by exploring the dimensions of a ‘war’ on climate change, I shall to seek 
to demonstrate that any infringements to human rights which might take place as a consequence 
of such a war are relatively minor compared to the impact on human rights of runaway climate 
change. 
 
II - Climate Change and Human Rights 
 
There is virtually unanimous agreement in the global scientific community about the existence of 
human-caused climate change.29 Related phenomena include sea level rise, eventual inundation 
of low-lying islands and coastal areas, and increases in the frequency and severity of droughts, 
floods, violent storms and heat waves.30 As stated above, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change has measured the progress of climate change and predicted its impacts in a 
series of increasingly disquieting reports.31 Some scientists have expressed concerns that even 
these reports have understated the magnitude and severity of the problem.32 The international 
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community has accepted the need for mitigation measures to curb the production of greenhouse 
gas emissions and thus slow down the rate of climate change.33 There is, however, a range of 
views on the nature of such measures and the extent to which they should be permitted to affect 
the global economy, corporate activity and individual freedoms.  
 
Climate change sceptics and their supporters maintain that the greatest threat to human rights and 
liberty is posed by unnecessary and unduly restrictive mitigation measures. Clive Hamilton 
provides many colourful examples of rhetoric from climate change sceptics and deniers, who 
describe themselves as defenders of human rights and portray even half-hearted governmental 
and international attempts to curb carbon emissions as authoritarian infringements on such rights. 
For instance, a Washington-based think-tank which denies the seriousness of climate change 
claims that it is ‘dedicated to advancing the principles of free enterprise and limited 
government’.34 According to one observer, Hugh Morgan, who was a key figure in the campaign 
to prevent the Howard government from acting on climate change, referred to government 
discussion papers on emissions trading as ‘Mein Kampf declarations’.35 Continuing with the 
Nazi Germany metaphors, President Putin’s economic adviser wrote in The Moscow Times that 
Kyoto was killing the world economy like an ‘International Auschwitz’.36 And Ian Campbell, 
while Australian Environment Minister, stated in January 2006 that the reason for his 
government’s failure to limit Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions was that ‘we are not trying to 
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run some kind of police state’.37 In the first Part of this article, I consider the impact of more 
stringent or radical mitigation measures on individual freedoms and the rule of law in Western 
nations. 
 
Climate change is, overwhelmingly, a global environmental problem and solving environmental 
problems by reference to human needs and rights has proved problematic in the past. There have 
been many critiques of the anthropocentric (or human-focused) thrust of existing environmental 
law by scholars and environmental ethicists, who have suggested that this area of law will remain 
ineffective as a tool for environmental protection unless it adopts a holistic, species-centred 
approach.38 Nevertheless, a number of commentators have adopted a human rights focus in 
addressing the problem of climate change. John von Doussa, former President of the Australian 
Human Rights Commission, maintained that ‘a human rights-based approach is the most 
effective way to respond to climate change’39 and even environmental lawyers have 
acknowledged the advantages of such an approach, with Kirsty Ruddock, principal solicitor of 
the NSW Environment Defender’s Office, describing it as ‘the most equitable way to solve the 
complex issues that arise’.40 
 
Commentators such as von Doussa and Ruddock are acknowledging that runaway climate 
change will have extraordinary and cataclysmic implications for both the global environment and 
the fundamental human rights of millions of people. I consider the implications of climate 
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change for human rights in the second Part of this article. It is increasingly apparent that, if left 
unchecked, climate change will have a catastrophic impact upon human rights. Thus, the 
requirement for urgent action on climate change arises as much from a human rights perspective 
as from a more holistic environmental perspective.  
 
III - The Vulnerability of Human Rights and the Rule of Law  
in a War on Climate change 
 
A cursory look at Western states in time of war, and most recently during the war on terror, 
reveals the vulnerability of fundamental human rights in times of national crisis or emergency. 
During the war on terror, as Hilary Charlesworth has pointed out, fundamental human rights 
have been treated as ‘some kind of fancy optional extra’ by Western governments keen to 
instigate tough anti-terrorism measures.41 The ‘key assumption’ in Australia’s counter-terrorism 
measures, according to Jenny Hocking, is that ‘civil and political liberties must “bend” in order 
to respond to terrorism’.42 Other commentators have also expressed alarm at the willingness on 
the part of Western states to sacrifice fundamental democratic freedoms in an ostensible attempt 
to save democracy.43 According to Michael Head, Australia during the war on terror began to 
resemble the dystopia in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.44 
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In this Part, I shall address the extent to which human rights, the rule of law and indeed 
democracy itself may be imperiled if we do wage war on climate change. 
 
A - Rights to Produce and Consume, Freedom of Speech  
and Freedom of Movement 
 
Rationing was certainly a feature of wartime Europe in the mid-twentieth century and most 
advocates of strong concerted action to curb carbon emissions accept that carbon rationing is 
inevitable.45 For instance, the principle of ‘contraction and convergence’, which has been 
popularised through the UK-based independent Global Commons Institute, requires an overall 
reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions and an equitable distribution of emission quotas 
amongst the world’s nations.46 This necessarily means that the capacities of Western citizens to 
produce and consume non-essential commodities will be curtailed in order to reduce our 
excessive per capita emissions. Indeed, journalist and climate change activist George Monbiot 
describes the campaign against climate change as a campaign ‘for austerity’.47  
 
The right to own property and the right to compensation if arbitrarily deprived of property are 
recognised human rights.48 The basic rights to food and water are also recognised human rights49 
which will, as will become apparent in Part IV, be jeopardised in a future world suffering from 
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the drastic impacts of runaway climate change. By contrast, the ‘rights’ to produce and consume 
non-essential commodities are not expressly set out in international covenants or declarations on 
human rights, or in national constitutions.50 Nevertheless, these habits of consumption are 
associated with liberal rights in capitalist societies, and are particularly prized in what Hamilton 
has termed an ‘age of affluenza’.51  
 
Some commentators, including climate change activists Mark Lynas and George Monbiot, have 
compared climate change denial to Holocaust denial52 and suggested that it may well be 
necessary to restrict freedom of speech by criminalising the promulgation of the arguments of 
climate change deniers or sceptics. For instance, Australian journalist Margo Kingston has 
written: ‘Perhaps there is a case for making climate change denial an offence. It is a crime 
against humanity, after all’.53 Public policy makers are, of course, very susceptible to the 
arguments of climate change sceptics, who offer the seductive promise that we can continue to 
adopt a ‘business as usual’ approach without endangering the planet. The astonishing popularity 
of the most recent Australian contribution to this genre, Ian Plimer’s Heaven and Earth,54 which 
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found its way on to the Sydney Morning Herald’s list of the top ten independent bestsellers,55 is 
testament to that. Yet it has been alleged that the works of climate change sceptics, including 
Plimer, contain erroneous and misleading statements and are frequently based on non-existent or 
false evidence.56 Climate change sceptics certainly disregard the vast amount of scientific 
evidence about the reality of human-caused global warming and its impacts. Furthermore, 
Monbiot and Hamilton have documented the somewhat sinister links between the fossil fuel 
industry and climate denialists.57 
 
The dangers in the promulgation of the arguments of climate change sceptics are obvious. In the 
Howard years, climate change scepticism dominated government policy and was used to justify 
prolonged apathy and inaction.58 The ideas of climate change sceptics remain publicly persuasive 
even with the advent of a new government which labeled Howard a climate change denier in its 
2007 election campaign.59 Family First Senator Steven Fielding, whose vote is critical for the 
passage of the Rudd government’s carbon pollution reduction scheme, adopted the views of 
climate change sceptics after journeying to the United States to attend a conference of the 
Heartland Institute, an organisation funded by the fossil fuel industry.60 He remains stubbornly 
convinced that the science on global warming is flawed, despite attempts by such prominent 
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figures as Minister for Climate Change Penny Wong and Australia’s Chief Scientist Penny 
Sackett to convince him otherwise.61  
 
Furthermore, the beliefs of climate change sceptics have also influenced the outcome of some 
climate change litigation, with the contentious arguments of Bob Carter and Ian Byatt cited in the 
Xstrata case.62 The Xstrata case involved a challenge by the Queensland Conservation Council 
and Mackay Conservation Group to an application by three companies to expand their open cut 
coal mining operations. The objectors sought conditions which would reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions from the companies’ mining operations. In that case, the presiding member of the 
Queensland Land and Resources Tribunal referred to Carter and Byatt’s view that the Stern 
Review63 was scientifically inaccurate and that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change’s Summary for Policymakers failed to provide accurate supporting evidence for its 
contention that human-created greenhouse gas emissions are causing global warming. He stated 
that ‘having become aware of … pages [authored by Carter and Byatt] and regarding them as 
relevant, it would have been inappropriate for me to have just ignored them’.64 
 
Given the considerable impact of the flawed arguments of climate change sceptics, should 
freedom of speech therefore be curtailed to ensure that such arguments are no longer 
disseminated? While freedom of speech is indeed widely recognised as a basic human right,65 its 
                                                 
61
  Tom Arup, ‘Warming Science: Fielding Unmoved’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 25 June 2009 
<http://www.smh.com.au/environment/global-warming/warming-science-fielding-unmoved-20090624-cwvu.html>. 
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  Re Xstrata Coal Queensland Pty Ltd v Ors [2007] QLRT 22 (‘Xstrata’). 
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  Stern, above n 2. 
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  Xstrata [2007] QLRT 22 [16-18]. 
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  See Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 19 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature on opened for signature on 16 December 1966 and entered 
into force on 23 March 1976. 
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curtailment is accepted in democratic societies where this is demonstrably in the public interest.66 
For instance, in Australia, the Commonwealth Racial Discrimination Act makes it unlawful to 
insult, humiliate, offend or intimidate another person or group in public on the basis of their 
race67 and our constitutional freedom of political communication can be curtailed where 
appropriate and adapted to a constitutionally legitimate public interest.68 
 
Freedom of movement could also be at risk in a war on climate change. George Monbiot 
manages to find ways by which Britain could cut its emissions by 90% without sacrificing its 
standard of living, with one notable exception: long-distance travel. He writes: ‘It has become 
plain to me that long-distance travel, high speed and the curtailment of climate change are not 
compatible. If you fly, you destroy other people’s lives.’69 The aviation industry is one of the 
fastest growing sources of carbon dioxide emissions.70 It is also increasingly clear that we cannot 
continue driving and riding in petrol-guzzling and carbon emission-producing cars. The right of 
freedom of movement is again one which is protected in international treaties and conventions71 
but restrictions on the freedom of movement which are necessary to protect national security, 
public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others are permissible under 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Monbiot also points out that although 
restrictions on long distance travel would be keenly felt by the travel-addicted Western 
consumer, such travelers constitute only a tiny percentage of the world’s population.  
                                                 
66
  For instance, Holocaust denial is an offence in some European countries, including Austria, where historian 
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67
  Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 18C. 
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on Civil and Political Rights. 
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These sorts of curtailments are indeed confronting but would leave intact the basic social and 
political institutions prized in the Western world. In fact, given that the freedom to produce and 
consume non-essential commodities is not expressly mentioned in international human rights 
declarations and conventions, and that it is generally accepted that the freedoms of speech and 
movement can be curtailed in the public interest, a regulatory regime which curtailed individual 
carbon emissions through quotas and rationing, prevented the dissemination of the arguments of 
climate change sceptics, and prohibited long-distance travel in all but the most extraordinary of 
circumstances may actually comply with international human rights law.  Even so, once the 
rhetoric of war is deployed, other valued freedoms and rights including those associated with 
democracy and even the rule of law may be endangered. 
 
B - The Right to Democratic Freedoms72 and the Adequacy of 
Democratic Solutions in a War on Climate Change 
 
Some commentators argue that the war on terror has created a Schmittian ‘state of exception’73 
in Western nations and have drawn upon the work of political theorist Giorgio Agamben in 
support of this argument.74 Agamben contends that Western democracies function as such states 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), 
and the right to political communication, which is encompassed within the freedom of speech. 
73
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of exception; he maintains that the state of exception prevails as ‘the dominant paradigm of 
government in contemporary politics’75 and in fact has ‘reached its maximum worldwide 
deployment’.76 Nations at war display many of the characteristics of the state of exception: the 
language of exceptionalism,77 enhanced executive power, the erosion of human rights and the 
setting aside of the rule of law. In fact, the modern state of exception is a ‘space devoid of law’,78 
populated by homo sacer or bare life. Homo sacer can be killed with impunity; he is not 
protected by human or divine law.79 Agamben asserts that Western citizens are homo sacer,80 
controlled and disciplined by biopolitical mechanisms. This is contentious but it is clear that 
homo sacer will feature prominently in any future state of exception which may form part of a 
war on climate change. 
 
Few of us would willingly assume the characteristics of homo sacer, who is exemplified in the 
much-surveyed and almost completely disempowered figure of the concentration camp 
prisoner.81 Can we, however, halt climate change within the framework of traditional liberal 
democracies? It may be that the necessary action requires the executive to act unilaterally, 
fettering individuals’ democratic freedoms and subjecting them to the intense surveillance which 
we associate with much more authoritarian regimes. Indeed, if Agamben’s hypothesis that 
Western democracies have already segued into states of exception is correct, then perhaps the 
costs associated with more authoritarian measures are already being borne.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Agamben in his books Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans, 1998) and State of 
Exception (Kevin Attrell trans, 2005) argues that increasingly Western democracies resemble states of exception. 
75
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  Ibid 87. 
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  See examples of this during the war on terror in Nicole Rogers, ‘Terrorist v Sovereign: Legal Performances in a 
State of Exception’ (2008) 12 Law Text Culture 159, 178-80. 
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  Agamben, State of Exception, above n 74,  51. 
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  Agamben, Homo Sacer, above n 74, 82. 
80
  Ibid 115. 
81
  Agamben has described concentration camps as ‘the pure, absolute and impassable biopolitical space’: ibid 123. 
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Nevertheless, the question of whether an agenda of environmental protection can be adopted and 
implemented by the liberal democratic states is one which has vexed green political theorists for 
many years. For the purposes of this article, I will do no more than gesture toward the magnitude 
of work on this subject.82 Some writers have argued that the ecological crisis can only be solved 
by authoritarian governments.83 Others take an eco-anarchist approach, rejecting the state in 
preference for other social and political structures.84 Those who would prefer to retain the 
structure of the democratic state nevertheless advocate reform. For instance, Robyn Eckersley 
argues for a re-invented or ‘ecologically renovated’ democratic state,85 and Andrew Dobson for 
an ‘active eco-state’.86 
 
Within the specific context of climate change, doubts have been raised about the adequacy of 
democratically-imposed solutions. At present, probably the two most authoritative texts in 
climate change discourse are the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Assessment 
Report87 and the 2006 Stern report, commissioned by the British government on the economics 
of climate change.88 Whether one accepts their predictions about the rate of climate change and 
its resulting impacts or the more catastrophic perspective recently articulated by James 
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Lovelock,89 it is clear that climate change will, in the not too distant future, provide Western 
democracies with a formidable challenge. Lovelock asserts that ‘orderly survival … may require, 
as in war, the suspension of democratic government for the duration of the survival 
emergency’.90 David Shearman and Joseph Wayne Smith believe that the climate change crisis 
can still be averted but not by democratic states;91 they should therefore be replaced by 
authoritarian governments of ‘ecowarrior/philosophers’,92 the ‘new priesthood of the new dark 
age’,93 who will strictly enforce ecological requirements and control all human activity affecting 
the environment.94 In fact, according to the authors, the collapse of liberal democratic structures 
is inevitable at a time of ‘civilization-threatening changes’ such as those brought about through 
climate change.95 Shirley Scott, in a critique of the response of international law to climate 
change, similarly concludes that both democracy, ‘fuelled by short-term objectives’, and 
capitalism, ‘driven by the quest for short-term profits’, are ill-equipped to provide effective 
solutions.96 Certainly, the difficulties experienced by the Rudd government in its attempts to pass 
its carbon pollution reduction scheme in 2009 are symptomatic of the failings of democracy in 
the context of climate change regulation. Political wrangling is hardly an appropriate response to 
a global crisis.  
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In addition, it seems unlikely that effective solutions to climate change cannot be found within 
the policy frameworks of neo-liberalism and/or neo-conservatism which most contemporary 
Western democracies have embraced. The deficiencies of the neo-liberal approach to climate 
change regulation are apparent in the flawed suggestion that we can resolve the crisis of climate 
change through the strategic trading of carbon credits on the open market. This approach relies 
on individual choice and market supremacy, integral components of both neo-liberal and neo-
conservative philosophies.97 If the global economy cannot be entrusted to the vagaries of the free 
market for the duration of the current economic crisis and must instead be rescued by regulatory 
intervention, surely it is somewhat foolish to believe that the climate change crisis can be safely 
consigned to ‘the invisible hand of the market’.98 This strategy seems particularly ill-advised 
given that economist Sir Nicholas Stern, although the most well-known advocate of market-
based solutions, has described climate change as ‘the greatest and widest ranging market failure 
ever seen.’99 One added concern about transforming climate change into a market issue is that, as 
Lisa Pryor has pointed out, ‘negotiations over trading and credits and prices per tonne and 
projections’ are ‘complex and boring’ and therefore hold little interest for the average attention-
deficit affected Western consumer. Pryor claims that were she ‘working on a public relations 
strategy on behalf of climate change denialists or the fossil fuels industry, [she] would be 
concentrating on making the issue so complicated and dry that it loses traction in the wider 
community.’100 
 
                                                 
97
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Thus far, Western democracies have failed to respond effectively and proactively to the 
catastrophic risks101 associated with climate change. In the above discussion, I have discussed 
some of the ramifications for human rights, the rule of law and democracy if Western 
governments adopt a strong, proactive and effective regulatory response to climate change. I 
have argued that the curtailment of certain human rights can be justified. It is more confronting 
to speculate on the wider consequences of a ‘war’ on climate change for the rule of law and for 
democratic rights and traditions. Nevertheless, it is sobering to compare such consequences with 
the human rights challenges of runaway climate change. In the next part, I shall consider the 
likely human rights violations which will occur as a consequence of climate change apathy. 
 
IV - The Vulnerability of Human Rights and the Rule of Law  
in a Time of Runaway Climate Change 
 
I have already referred to Michael Head’s argument that the Australian legislative response to the 
war on terror gestured towards an Orwellian dystopia. Lawyers tend to look to the past rather 
than imagine the future, but some have been less hesitant to conjure up images of the dystopia 
which awaits us should we fail to halt climate change – should we lose, or not even wage, the 
war. In the remainder of this article, I shall contemplate the futuristic visions in the writings of 
novelists Steve Amsterdam and Julie Bertagna, journalists and writers Mark Lynas and Gwynne 
Dyer, cultural studies scholar Nick Mansfield and scientist James Lovelock, and discuss some of 
the implications of runaway climate change for human rights and the rule of law. 
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Steve Amsterdam sets his collection of short stories102 in future worlds afflicted by, alternately, 
endless rain and drought and consequent food and water shortages, and inhabited by a 
bewildered shifting group of people far more accustomed to hardship, deprivation and loss than 
we are in the western world today. However, at least there is still land, of sorts, in his 
imaginings. Julie Bertagna, writing for young adults, conjures up a world almost completely 
covered in water and images of global refugees in boats and rafts, crammed together in miserable 
conditions outside the large sea walls which protect the new sky cities. She writes: 
 
There is no land or harbour, only a blurred mass that heaves and bobs around the city. A huge, 
dull-coloured live thing. The vile, rotting stench of an open drain hits as the clustering thing 
sharpens into focus. Mara gasps as she sees it’s a heaving mass of humanity. A chaos of refugee 
boats crams the sea around the city and clings like a fungus to the huge wall that seems to bar all 
entry to refugees.103 
 
It is not only novelists who are exploring the dimensions of a climate-changed future. English 
journalist Mark Lynas begins his account of a gradually warming world by reflecting on the 
savagery and lawlessness which followed the destruction of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina. 
Viewing the televised coverage of the disaster and its aftermath was like ‘peering through a 
portal into the future’.104 In his account, the prospect of social collapse and conflict intensifies as 
the world warms by degrees105 and hundreds of millions of people are displaced from their 
homes.106 The hypothetical future scenarios in Gwynne Dyer’s Climate Wars107 similarly 
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encompass conflict including nuclear war, mass displacement of populations, widespread famine 
and water shortages, fortress nations with sealed borders, and even eco-terrorism. 
 
Nick Mansfield’s view of the future is also bleak. In reflecting on the cultural politics of climate 
change, he maintains that this ‘will be a politics of differences, but of de facto autocracies as 
well, of wars and the annihilation of all rights, and it will fall differentially on human groups, but 
cataclysmically, perhaps taking capitalism and all its subversive shadows with it’.108 According 
to Mansfield, a climate-changed future is a time ‘when wars and the undermining of civil rights 
will occur and recur’.109 Finally, James Lovelock voices similar fears that ‘we may be unable to 
prevent a global decline into a chaotic world ruled by brutal warlords on a devastated Earth’110 
He envisages the few stranded ‘lifeboats’ of humanity111 turning away climate change refugees, 
and speculates that human civilisation itself is endangered by climate change.112 
 
Such accounts can perhaps be dismissed as part of a tradition of apocalyptic predictions in 
environmental discourse, beginning as far back as the 1960s with Rachel Carson’s Silent 
Spring.113 Many of these predictions subsequently proved to be inaccurate. Indeed, Hulme 
conceptualises the current climate change ‘discourse of fear’ as culturally situated and therefore 
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‘unstable’ and transient.114 He optimistically predicts that the fear of climate catastrophe will 
change or dissipate as a consequence of cultural changes.115  
 
Although we can perhaps dismiss the above writings as part of a culturally-conditioned 
‘discourse of fear’, what are we to make of the predictions of military experts that climate 
change will result in wars, chaos and displacement of populations of a magnitude we can hardly 
imagine? Reports of military experts such as the October 2003 report commissioned by the 
United States Department of Defense,116 the United States independent think-tank CNA’s study 
of April 2007117 which presented the views of twelve retired generals and admirals, and the 
November 2007 report118 co-authored by high profile political and intelligence figures, the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center for a New American Security, all 
highlight the dire challenges which climate change poses for global stability. The Australian 
Defence Force also concluded in 2007 that environmental stress caused by climate change will 
raise significant security concerns.119 In fact, the ramifications of climate change for international 
security have been acknowledged in a 2007 debate in the United Nations Security Council.120 
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In the midst of these predictions, increasingly, and belatedly, the impact of climate change on 
human rights is being considered by scholars, activists and domestic and international 
organisations in the human rights field. It is now generally agreed that climate change poses a 
threat to a large number of human rights protected in key international instruments, such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.121 Human 
rights affected by climate change include the right to life,122 the right to adequate food,123 the 
right to water,124 the right to health,125 the right to privacy and family life,126 the right to 
property,127 and the rights of indigenous people to participate in traditional cultural practices and 
live on their traditional lands.128  
 
The United Nations Human Rights Council passed two Resolutions in 2008 and 2009129 
recognising the implications of climate change for human rights, and held a panel discussion on 
the relationship between climate change and human rights in June 2009. In addition, the Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has undertaken a study on this 
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relationship. In its report, it concluded that climate change-related impacts ‘have a range of 
implications for the effective enjoyment of human rights’130 and that the effects of climate 
change are already being felt by individuals and communities around the world.131 
 
Some of the victims and potential victims of climate change managed to focus the world’s 
attention on their plight when the Inuit people lodged a petition with the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights in December 2005 and the Small Island Developing States 
adopted the Male’ Declaration132 in 2007.  
 
A - The Inuit petition and the Male’ Declaration 
 
We are currently witnessing the first attempts at climate change litigation based on the violation 
of international human rights. In the Inuit petition,133 the Inuit people of the Arctic argued that 
the effects of global warming violated their human rights as set out in the American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international law instruments.134 The Inuit people are 
experiencing the accelerated impacts of climate change as annual arctic temperatures are 
increasing more than twice as fast as temperatures in the rest of the world. The disappearance of 
sea ice, the melting of the permafrost and unpredictable changes in weather patterns are affecting 
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their enjoyment of their traditional lands, their cultural practices, their homes and their diet. They 
alleged that the United States, as the world’s largest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions, 
was responsible for these human rights violations.  
 
Although the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights refused to review the petition, 
testimony on the impact of climate change on the human rights of Inuit people was presented at 
the 2007 February and March session of the Commission.135 One commentator has argued that 
the petition will undoubtedly lead to future human rights-based legal action on climate change.136 
In fact, the residents of one Inuit village, Kivalina, which will soon have to be abandoned due to 
erosion caused by the melting of Arctic ice, have mounted an action in public nuisance in a 
United States court against oil, power and coal companies.137 The plaintiffs have also alleged 
civil conspiracy, arguing that some of the defendants conspired to create a false debate in order 
to allay public concerns about global warming.138 The outcome of this litigation will be hugely 
influential in determining whether other vulnerable communities and even nations decide to 
launch climate change lawsuits based on violations of international human rights. 
 
The Male’ Declaration highlights the catastrophic impact of climate change and associated rising 
sea levels for Small Island Developing States. In the Declaration, member States called for 
urgent action on climate change and further assessment of its impact on human rights by the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations 
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Human Rights Council. Prior to the Declaration, Tuvalu had threatened in 2002 to mount an 
action in the International Court of Justice against countries such as the United States and 
Australia based on their refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Although direct causal links 
between emitters and the damaging impacts of climate change are difficult to establish, the then 
government of Tuvalu maintained that the significant contributions to global warming by 
Australia and the United States were instrumental in the rapid destruction of Tuvalu. The action, 
however, was never mounted.139 
 
B - Climate change refugees 
 
From an Australian perspective, the plight of prospective climate change refugees from the 
Pacific island states and Torres Strait Islands requires urgent attention. Robert Aisi has described 
climate change as ‘undermining the very basis for the existence of 12 independent Pacific Island 
countries, as well as seven Pacific Island Territories’.140 For Torres Strait Islanders, the rising 
tides of a climate-changed world may achieve what the ‘tide of history’141 failed to do to their 
native title rights. Pacific and Torres Strait Islanders will be among the first groups of climate 
change refugees and the deficiencies of international refugee law in its application to this group 
and other groups of climate change refugees are increasingly highlighted,142 although mostly by 
non-legal scholars.143 There is no provision for climate change refugees in the 1951 United 
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Legal scholars are beginning to look at 
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other possible avenues of redress in international and domestic law for the Torres Strait 
Islanders;144 one such possibility may be a remedy under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).145 
 
Australia’s receptivity to an influx of climate change refugees has also been discussed. Our lack 
of hospitality in relation to asylum seekers is arguably deplorable;146 will we be any more 
amenable to the idea of accommodating climate change refugees? Certainly an Australian Labor 
Party Discussion paper,147 which was subsequently adopted as policy by the Australian Labor 
Party national conference in April 2007,148 recommended that Australia adopt a proactive and 
strategic approach to climate change in the Pacific for security as well as environmental and 
altruistic reasons; the authors suggested that Australia offer assistance to and accept refugees 
from Pacific countries. However, a Bill put forward by the Greens in 2007 to amend the 
Migration Act 1958 to create a ‘climate change refugee visa’ failed to gain the Senate’s 
support.149 Even New Zealand, historically far more generous than Australia in accepting asylum 
seekers, has imposed criteria for a selection process for Pacific Islanders under its Pacific Access 
Category.150 
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Understandably, the present debate on human rights and climate change is focused upon the 
immediate plight of the inhabitants of islands which are rapidly becoming uninhabitable, and 
upon the circumstances of the Inuit people, whose homes are also being destroyed. The wider 
implications for human rights in the ravaged future world of runaway climate change have 
received less attention, but those who have considered such a future offer little hope for the long-
term resilience of a human rights-based legal framework. The relocation of hundreds of 
thousands Pacific State Islanders, Carteret Islanders and Torres Strait Islanders may be 
problematic, but relocating hundreds of millions of climate change refugees is an altogether 
different prospect.151 
 
V - Conclusion 
 
I have argued that taking effective action on climate change will impinge upon fundamental 
freedoms and possibly threaten the rule of law. It may alter the shape and functioning of our 
democratic institutions. It may require strong, even authoritarian, leadership, rationing and 
considerable sacrifice. There is, however, no easy way to avoid this. We have been warned by a 
large number of the world’s most eminent scientists that failing to act, or negotiating only 
tokenistic emission cuts, will inevitably lead to runaway climate change. A war on climate 
change may be unpalatable and unacceptable for climate change sceptics, industry, and liberal 
thinkers but the alternative is much, much worse.  
 
It seems highly probable that unless we conduct an effective war on climate change, we will end 
up at war with each other on an increasingly uninhabitable planet, protecting our borders from a 
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constant influx of desperate refugees while grappling with drought, famine, fires and floods. And 
in such a world, in the worst of possible futures, rhetoric about human rights and the rule of law 
will have little relevance. 
